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Solidarity, Self-lnterest and the Unionization 
Differential Between Europe 
and North America 
Roy J . Adams 
In this article, the « solidarity » argument is ques-
tionned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. It is 
argued instead that the unionization differential between the 
two continents may be more adequately explained in terms 
of différences on key dimensions of the existing industrial 
relations Systems. 
It has often been noted that European workers are, in gênerai, more 
highly unionized than those of North America. l Although there has 
been little attempt to analyze this situation in depth, the usual expdanation 
is that European workers are more « solidaristic » than their North 
American counterparts. 
In this article we question the 
« solidarity » argument on both the-
oretical and empirical grounds. We 
argue l instead tha the unionization 
1
 The most récent estimate of union membership as a percent of non-agricul-
tural wage and salary employment in several industrialized countries has been made 
by Everett Kassalow and is reproduced below : 
Sweden 80% Denmark 58% Germany 38% 
Belgium 71% Great Britain 48% Italy 33% 
Norway 65% Ireland 43% United States 30% 
Austria 65% Netherlands 41% France 23% 
Source : Everett KASSALOW, « European Industrial Relations Systems in 
Transition : Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict and Coopération », Industrial 
Relations (Berkeley), May 1974. In Canada, as in the U.S. approximately one 
third of non-agricultural wage and salary earners are organized. For an analysis of 
récent European membership trends see Ivor ROBERTS, « Trade Union member-
ship trends in Seven Western European countries 1950-1968 » Industrial Relations 
Journal, Winter, 1973. 
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differential between the two continents may be more adequately explained 
in terms of différences on key dimensions of the existing industrial re-
lations Systems. Such an analysis also helps to explain why North Amer-
ican unions hâve not been more successful in organizing the unorganized. 
THE RIDDLE OF THE UNION MEMBERSHIP DIFFERENTIAL 
In many respects the higher levels of unionization in Europe are 
puzzling. Indeed, several aspects of the European situation would appear 
to be detrimental to the maintenance of high levels of union membership. 
Although there is considérable diversity, the most common form of 
collective bargaining in Europe is that which takes place between unions 
and employers at the national, régional or industrial level. 2 Contrary 
to the North American practice, collective agreements do not often provide 
for the establishment of actual terms and conditions of employment but 
instead set only minimums or call for gênerai increase. In most cases, it 
is perfectly acceptable for individual employées or groups of employées 
to bargain for better terms on their own.3 It is also generally acceptable 
for employers to unilaterally décide to pay above union rates and with 
the considérable inflation of the past décade, this has become the common 
practice. 4 The value of the union contract to employées under such con-
ditions is questionable. Furthermore, whatever progress the unions are 
able to achieve usually is bénéficiai to both union and non-union members 
and thus, on this score, employées hâve little incentive to become or re-
main trade unionists. 5 
2
 Adolf STURMTHAL, Comparative Labor Movements (Belmont, California : 
Wadsworth, 1972), Chapter 4. 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4 Lloyd ULMAN and Robert J. FLANAGAN, Wage Restraint : A Study of 
Income Policies in Western Europe (Berkeley : University of California Press, 
1971). 
5 Franz Gamellscheg notes of Germany, « Inasmueh as he gets everything the 
member gets, the non-member asks himself why he should feel obliged to pay 
dues and take part in ail sorts of union activity. » Franz Gamellscheg, « Outlines 
of Collective Labor Law in the Fédéral Republic of Germany » in Alfred Kamin 
(ed) Western European Labor and the American Corporation (Washington, D.C. : 
Bureau of National Affairs, 1970) p. 261. For a discussion of the problem in the 
Netherlands see John P. WINDMULLER Labor Relations in the Netherlands 
(Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1969) pp. 193-199. 
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In North America a similar situation occurred as the resuit of légis-
lation which provided that the union would be the bargaining agent for 
ail of the employées in a given bargaining unit. 6 This gave rise to con-
sidérable problems for the unions. How could they persuade non-members 
within the unit to become unionists when ail the fruits of the union effort 
could be acquired without the necessity of paying union dues ? Indeed, 
how could members be convinced to maintain their membership ? « Free-
Riders » it was feared would gladly accept the results of the union efforts 
without contributing to the financial base which made it possible. 7 
The most prévalent solution was the establishment of the union shop 
or one of its variants which required those in the bargaining unit to be-
come members or be discharged. By the late 1960's, 85% of the union 
contracts in the United States called for some version of the union shop. 8 
In some cases, however, unions were prohibited from making use 
of this device. Several States in the U.S., for example, passed « Right-to-
Work » laws making mandatory union membership illégal. However, 
North American unions hâve always been characterized by strong shop 
floor organizations and thèse units hâve no doubt been instrumental in 
enabling the unions to maintain their integrity. Without either the union 
shop or a strong shop-floor présence, union strength would most likely 
hâve been sapped and the incidence of low membership would be much 
higher.9 
With this in mind, the European situation becomes even more puz-
zling. Only very recently has there been a surge of interest in Europe 
towards the establishment of strong union organization on the shop 
6
 AJthough there are important différences between U.S. and Canadian labor 
law and between the laws of the provinces within Canada, the basic outline of 
North American législation is quite similar and will be considered as a unit hère. 
For an analysis of the development of North American législation see H.D. 
WOODS, Labour Policy in Canada, 2nd éd. (Toronto : Macmillan of Canada, 
1973). 
7 See, for example, Howard D. MARSHALL and Natalie J. MARSHALL, Col-
lective Bargaining (Toronto : Random House of Canada, 1971) pp. 207-223. 
8 Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN and Donald E. CULLEN, The Labor Sector 
2nd éd. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 177. 
9 Where unionism is not compulsory, however, unions find it ail but im-
possible to sign up 100% of potential members. See, John M. GLASGOW, «The 
Right to Work Controversy Again, » Labor Law Journal, February, 1967. 
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floor.10 Within the shop the most prévalent worker représentation body 
has been the works council. Représentatives to such councils are, in many 
cases, « elected by ail employées both union and non-union, in a given 
plant or office. » n It is generally provided that the union has some 
influence over the list of candidates. However, « thèse committees, once 
nominated, are clearly plant-linked and -based, and at best only in-
directly subject to union control. > 12 In fact, it is not uncommon for 
employers to « deliberately use the plant committee to divert worker 
loyalty away from the union. » 13 
Nor hâve the unions in Europe been able to establish union security 
devices on a broad scale.14 In many countries employers hâve been 
adamantly opposed to the establishment of the union shop. In Sweden, 
for example, the employers required the Confédération of Swedish Trade 
Unions to agrée that, as a condition of récognition, the unions would not 
seek to inhibit the right of the employers to hire and fire employées re-
gardless of their union affiliation or non-affiliation.15 A similar clause 
was demanded by British employers in the engineering industry.16 In 
10
 See, Everett M. KASSALOW, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations, An 
International Comparison (New York : Random House, 1969), pp. 159-161 ; 
Paul MALLES, Trends in Industrial Relations Systems of Continental Europe (Ot-
tawa : Task Force on Labour Relations, Study No. 7, 1969) pp. 54-57 and STURM-
THAL, op. cit., pp. 43-47. 
« KASSALOW, op. cit., p. 153. 
12 Ibid., 154. 
13 Loc. Cit. 
14 In récent years, however, the establishment of such schemes has become a 
more important issue. For example, the check-off, whereby management deducts 
union dues from salaries and remits them to the union, has become popular during 
the past décade in such countries as Germany, Sweden and Great Britain. In Bel-
gium the Netherlands many unions hâve been able to bargain for spécial benefits 
for union members only. For Germany see Gamellscheg op. cit. ; for Great Britain 
and Sweden, RJ. Adams Union Behavior as a Factor in Union Growth, (Madison, 
Wisconsin : unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1973) ; for Bel-
gium, Roger Blanpain « Labor Relations in Belgium » M. Kamin (éd.) Western 
European Labor, op. cit. and for the Netherlands, Windmuller, Labor Relations in 
the Netherlands, op. cit. 
15 B. CARLSON, Trade Unions in Sweden (Stockholm : tidens forlag, 1969), 
pp. 25-27. 
16 H.A. CLEGG, The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford : 
Basil Blackwell, 1972), p. 126. 
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some European countries — Germany and France are examples — com-
pulsory union memberships is illégal.17 
Furthermore, until recently, European unions hâve not pushed very 
hard for the formai establishment of union security devices. They hâve 
been more ideologically committed than those in North America and, as 
Kassalow puts it, many were « loath to compel a non-believer in the 
union ideology to join, pay dues and participate in [union] activity. » 18 
In short, the European situation would seem to be made to order 
for a deep and persistent « free-rider » problem. How then hâve the Eu-
ropean unions been able to achieve substantially higher levels of unioniza-
tion than North American unions which, in large part, hâve solved this 
problem ? 
SOLIDARITY OR SELF-lNTEREST? 
As noted above, the most prévalent explanation is that European 
workers are more « class çonscious * and « solidaristic » than those in 
North America. The ethic of individualism, it is argued, became deeply 
imbedded in North American culture and worked against joint action. In 
Europe on the other hand the feudalistic tradition, « denied workers ac-
cess to économie opportunity or political power. » 19 They had to « strug-
gle for a décade or more into the 20th century to achieve such elementary 
rights as public éducation and, more important, universal maie suffrage. » 
Thus, « European workers were driven together to make common cause 
to advance their interest. » 2° Unlike his American or Canadian counter-
part « the European labor leader has been able to capitalize on a cultural 
milieu in which union membership has been the natural response of the 
working man. » 21 
17
 See Gamellscheg, op. cit. and Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, «The Seulement of 
Labor Disputes in France» in Benjamin Aaron (éd.) Labor Courts and Grievance 
Procédures in Western Europe (Berkeley, California : University of California 
Press, 1971) p. 4. Despite its illegality compulsory unionism is still practiced in 
the newspaper industry in France. See Frédéric Meyers, The State and Government 
Employée Unions in France (Ann Arbor, Michigan : Institute of Labor and In-
dustrial Relations, University of Michigan, Wayne State University, 1971), p. 5. 
18 KASSALOW, op. cit., p. 141. 
19 Derek C. BOK and John T. DUNLOP, Labor and the American Com-
munity (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 48. 
20 Loc. Cit. 
21 Ibid., p. 50. 
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This argument appears to be of the same genre as many other in 
sociology and économies. They ail follow the rationale that « Groups of 
individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their 
common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act 
on behalf of their personal interests. » Presumably, « the idéal that groups 
tend to act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logi-
cally from [the] widely accepted premise of rational self-interested be-
havior. » M However, in a récent brilliant analysis, Oison, has argued 
that « the notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their com-
mon or group interests, far from being a logical implication of the assump-
tion that individuals in a group will rationally further their individual in-
terests, is in fact inconsistent with the assumption. » 23 With spécifie 
regard to the trade union he notes that « A labor union works primarily 
to get higjier wages, better working conditions, législation favorable to 
workers, and the like ; thèse things by their very nature ordinarily cannot 
be withheld from any particular workers in the group represented by the 
union. Unions are for 'collective bargaining', not individual bargaining. 
It follows that most of the achievements of a union, even if they were 
more impressive than the staunchest unionists claims, could offer the 
rational worker no incentive to join ; his individual efforts would not 
hâve a noticeable effect on the outeome, and whether he supported the 
union or not he would still get the benefits of its achievement. » M 
Oison further argues that American (and British) trade unions be-
gan as small local organisations which were able to provide differential 
« social > benefits to potential members but that once large national or-
ganizations evolved it became necessary to coerce workers into joining 
unions by way of union security devices. Althought Oison limited his 
analysis primarily to the American situation his thesis clearly has univer-
sal implications. 
An alternative interprétation of the « solidarity » argument might 
be that European workers joined trade unions not out of rational self-
interest but instead out of altruistic sentiment for the objectives of the 
movement. The worker may hâve reasoned that although he would re-
ceive the benefits of the movement whether he joined or not, he would 
join in any event since he sympathized with the goals of the movement. 
22 Mancur OLSON, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (New York : Schocken 
Books, 1968), p. 1. 
23 Ibid., p. 2. 
24 Ibid., p . 76. 
SOLIDARITY, SELF-ÏNTEREST AND THE LJNIONIZATION DlFFERENTIAL . . . 503 
If this were the case, then European workers would hâve to be deemed, 
in the strict sensé of the work, irrational. 
Despite a good deal of spéculation, empirical studies on worker 
attitudes towards unionization in Europe are at a premium. It is certainly 
true as Sturmthal, Kassalow and others hâve pointed out that the labor 
movements in Europe during the late 1800's and early 1900's took on, 
in many ways, the character of a separate sub-culture. 25 In addition to 
trade unions and political parties, the labor movement also consisted of 
numerous social, educational and co-operative associations. Within such 
a milieu it is perhaps understandable that many workers did join unions 
as a matter of course. To hâve done otherwise may hâve resulted in social 
ostracism. Thus, when social conséquences are considered as well as 
économie outeomes it may hâve been perfectly rational for such indivi-
duals to hâve joined trade unions. Even hère, however, récent research 
indicates that the common dichotomy between political and social soli-
darity in Europe vs. the self-interested business unionism of North Amer-
ica has been greatly overdrawn. As Stearns has pointed out « Historians 
. . . too often look at the expressed ideas of a movement or organization 
without cheeking the extent to which the ideas were held by participants 
or manifested in their behavior. » On the basis of his research on strikes 
in France during the early years of the 19th century, Stearns concludes 
that « French workers as a whole, despite their impressive strike activity, 
sought only limited and often traditional goods before World War I. » 
He notes further that « Few strikes .. . revealed much interest in the 
political process. » 26 
Whatever may hâve been the case 50 or 100 years ago, évidence 
is beginning to émerge (although still quite limited) that présent day 
European workers are not so différent from their North American coun-
terparts in their attitudes towards unionization. 
The limits of altruism and the need for European unions to provide 
individualized benefits is vividly illustrated in a study carried out by 
25 KASSALOW, op. cit., pp. 18-20 ; STURMTHAL, op. cit., p. 1. 
26 Peter N. STEARNS, Revolutionary Syndication and French Labor (New 
Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1971) pp. 1, 40, 43. In a récent con-
temporary study of automobile workers in the U.S., Italy, Argentina and India. 
Form concluded that « workers in ail four countries reject political unionism in 
favor of job unionism. » William H. FORM « Job vs. Political Unionism : A Cross-
Cultural Comparison » Industrial Relations (Berkeley) May, 1973, p. 224. 
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Mark van de Vall. On the basis of interviews with a sample of Dutch 
trade unionists he concluded that, « In the perception of both the blue 
and white collar worker, the main benefits he receives in exchange for 
his union dues are those which the organization can give him as an indi-
vidual. As European unions play no rôle in hiring, thèse amount to assis-
tance and advice in the case of dispute between employée and manage-
ment. From the point of view of their own membership, both catégories 
of workers regard thèse individual benefits as more important than the 
union's fonction in behalf of groups or society. » 27 The sample had a 
generally low regard for both the political and collective bargaining activi-
ties of their unions. Although some of the respondents did note that one 
of their reasons for joining was « solidarity », the most prévalent motive 
was the désire to acquire what van de Vall calls « conflict insurance. » 
By this term he means « the provision of légal and material assistance in 
the case of individual grievances. » 
In short, most workers did not join to gain the generalized benefits 
of collective bargaining or political représentation but instead to acquire 
union protection in the event of individual disputes with their employer. 
No doubt, once the employées had become trade union members they 
supported the political and bargaining activities of their unions (at least 
passively). However, thèse union functions did not provide sufficient in-
centive to join. 
Van de Vall quotes évidence which indicates that a similar situation 
may be found in Germany. ^ Further évidence for the prevalence of this 
response is provided by a study carried out by this writer in Great Britain 
and Sweden. 29 Six unions which catered primarily for clérical and admini-
strative workers in the private sector were analyzed in some depth. Ail 
six of the unions provided their members with personal differential bene-
fits to some extent. However, Swedish union members acquire much 
greater individual benefit and, in turn, the Swedish unions were the more 
highly organized. 
In North America unions also provide their members with « conflict 
insurance » primarily by way of the grievance procédure. In order to 
27
 Mark van DE VALL, Labor Organizations (Cambridge : The University 
Press, 1970), p. 120. 
28 Ibid., p. 127. 
29 Roy J. ADAMS, Union Behavior as A Factor in Union Growth, op. cit. 
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establish such a procédure the union must, however, be « recognized >. 
In Canada and the U.S. the characteristic method of achieving récogni-
tion is by way of a government sponsored représentation élection.30 If 
the union wins the élection then the employer is required to recognize 
it as the exclusive bargaining agent for ail of his employées. Trie em-
ployer is also precluded from dealing with other unions. The union, in 
turn, is required to fairly represent the interests of ail the employées in 
the bargaining unit. Once a collective agreement is reached, a grievance 
procédure is established whereby disputes over the application of contract 
provisions may be peaceably settled, usually with binding arbitration 
as the final step. It is important to note the legalistic meaning of a 
« grievance » in North America. The term does not refer to any com-
plaint or problem that an employée might hâve. Instead it specifically 
relates to contract provisions. Although the leeway for disputes over such 
problems as discipline may be quite board, extra-contractual issues need 
not be entertained by management and are often removed from the orbit 
of union influence by the establishment of management rights clauses. 
The situation in Europe is much différent. Récognition is tradi-
tionally granted by employers' associations on a national, régional or 
industry-wide basis.31 Several unions may be involved and the concept 
of exclusive représentation within a given bargaining unit is practically 
unknown.32 The most publicized aspect of thèse Systems is the high 
level of collective bargaining as noted above. For our purpose, however, 
there is another much less publicized aspect that is more important. 
Grievances usually do not hâve the restricted North American meaning 
but instead cover essentially any employment problem which the worker 
might expérience. For example, van de Vall notes that the member may 
turn to the union for assistance concerning « conflicts about unfair treat-
ment, unjustified dismiss al or demotion, underpayment and incorrect 
application of social législation. » 33 Only rarely is there any clear dis-
30 WOODS, op. cit., Chapter IV. 
31
 In a few countries such as France and Belgium the State désignâtes certain 
unions as « most représentative » which provides them with some degree of formai 
récognition. This form of State récognition does not provide as much légal pro-
tection as North American certification procédures, however. 
32 Recently, however, the concept was introduced in Great Britain. See, Jo-
seph W. GARBARINO, «The British Experiment with Industrial Relations Re-
form », Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January, 1973. The law has en-
countered substantial union opposition and the Labor government which was re-
turned in 1974 is planning to revise it. 
33 VAN DE VALL, op. cit., p. 131. 
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tinction made between disputes over « interests » and disputes over 
« rights ». 34 Unions, generally, do not hâve any légal duty to represent 
non-members. Although European unions do not often reject requests 
from non-members (who agrée to join the union) for assistance, the 
union member acquires a greater sensé of job security and protection 
against arbitrary management actions. 
The rôle of the union in grievance processing has been complicated 
by the existence of the works councils which may also become involved 
with grievances. In many countries, primarily because of intensive em-
ployer resistence, unions hâve had a very difficult time establishing 
viable shop-floor organizations similar to those in North America. This 
does not mean however, that the unions necessarily play little or no rôle 
in the day to day working life of the employée as has often been 
suggested. As the studies noted above indicate, an employée or group 
of employées who feel that they hâve been unfairly treated may turn to 
the union for advice and assistance and the union may directly inter-
vene on their behalf. The works councils hâve neither the expertise nor 
power to be of real value in such cases. Although employers strongly resist 
shop floor union organizations they hâve for the most part recognized 
the legitimacy of the unions as the spokesmen for the worker and respect 
the political and économie power that the unions may bring to bear. 
They are, therefore, not prone to take union initiatives on behalf of 
individual workers lightly. However, union influence concerning such 
individual issues does vary a good deal and it is precisely in those coun-
tries where it is greatest (e.g. Scandinavia and Belgium) that union 
membership is the highest. 35 Furthermore, even though the unions may 
not entirely control the works councils, as Sturmthal points out « The 
influence in favor of the workers which the council can exert within 
the plant largely dépends in the last resort upon the power of the 
union... » 36 Indeed, despite statutory requirements for the establish-
34 Several countries do legally distinguish between the two types of disputes. 
In practice, however, the désignation is blurred. See Benjamin AARON « Forward » 
in Aaron (éd.) Labor Courts and Grievance Seulement in Western Europe, op. cit., 
p. XVIII. 
35 ADAMS, op. cit. ; T.L. JOHNSTON, Collective Bargaining in Sweden 
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1962) and Roger BLANPAIN, « Labor 
Relations in Belgium », op. cit. 
36 Adolf STURMTHAL, Workers Councils (Cambridge : Harvard University 
Press, 1964), p. 160. Sturmthal does go on to point out, however, that many union 
members do not make this connection which helps to explain the récent drive 
of the unions to establish themselves more firmly on the shop floor. 
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ment of councils in some countries, in situations where the unions are 
very weak councils may not be formed at ail. 
Thus, in both Europe and North America a critical function of 
the union is the protection provided to members against arbitrary mana-
gerial décisions which may negatively affect the employment situation 
of the worker. The essential différences between the two continents are 
that in Europe, contrary to the North American practice, the union need 
not achieve a majority in any particular organization to be of individual 
benefit to its members ; nor is it generally restricted as to the issues that 
it may raise. In fact, it is not uncommon for a union to represent 
less than a majority of employées in any given plant or shop. Thus, if 
the North American System were to be superimposed on Europe the 
union membership differential might be entirely erased. 
Although the législation in the U.S. and Canada formally encourages 
collective bargaining and presumably the unions which make it possible, 
in fact it has precisely the opposite effect.37 An employer who has more 
than 50% of his employées vote in favor of a union is required to bar gain 
in good faith. On the other hand the législation legitimizes the right of 
the employer to entirely exclude a union which has not achieved majority 
status. 
The « right » of the employer to fight unionization is indicated by 
the existence of several books by apparently reputable lawyers which 
seek to instruct employers in the techniques of defeating unionization 
efforts. The title of one récent book is indicative : Labor Unions : How 
to Avert Them, Beat Them, Out-negotiate Them, Live with Them, 
Unload Them.38 The effectiveness of such techniques is indicated by 
a study carried out by the AFL-CIO of 500 union élection campaigns 
in the U.S. Where the employers actively sought to thwart récognition, 
the unions lost 50% of the élections. But « where there was no 
employer campaigning, [the unions] won every élection save one — 
a tie. »39 In Europe such blatant employer interférence with the 
37 For an analysis of the defects of Canadian législation in this regard see 
George S. BAIN, «The Growth of White-collar Unionism and Public Policy in 
Canada », Industrial Relations (Laval) April, 1969. 
38 Herbert I. ROTHENBERG and Steven B. SILVERMAN, Labor Unions : 
How io Avert Them, Beat Them, Out-Negotiate Them, Live with Them, Unload 
Them (Elkins Park, Pa. : Management Relations, Inc., 1973). 
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accepted employée right to join an association of his choice would not be 
accepted. Instead, the unions in Europe hâve been fully accepted as 
one of the key « social partners > in the industrial relations System.m 
The level of acceptance in North America is much lower. As John 
Porter has noted « Because they challenge... historié rights of property, 
trade unions are intruders whose présence is only grudgingly accepted 
by other institutional élites and by the rest of society. They are accepted 
for their power rather than any contribution they are thought to make 
to social life. »41 
Although 40 or 45% of the employées in any given enterprise may 
désire union services, North American law strips the union of the ability 
to be of any meaningful benefit to them. Not only is the employer 
protected by law in refusing to deal with a union in such a situation, 
but also the union is forbidden to exert any industrial pressure on the 
employer. For the most part, the unions hâve accepted this situation 
and make little or no attempt to provide service to workers in non-
recognized units. 
Récent studies indicate that subtantial numbers of unorganized 
employées would form or join unions if it were not for the négative 
character of North American public policy. For example, one récent 
investigation of the attitudes of U.S. middle managers towards unioniza-
tion found that one-third of those sampled would join or consider joining 
a trade union. 42 
Since non-recognized unions are of little benefit one finds completely 
dichotomy situations. Either the enterprise is fully unionized or it is 
not unionized at ail. Given this circumstance, the problem faced by 
North American unions is to organize the majority of employées in one 
small unit after another — a very difficult task. 
39 Hugh P. HUSBAND, Jr., Management Faces Unionization (N.Y. : Manage-
ment Sourcebooks, 1969), p. 4. 
40
 This does not mean that European employers welcome unions or are any 
more favorably disposed towards unionization than their North American brethren. 
Political and social realities, however, make it very difficult for European manage-
ment to openly « fight » unionization. 
41 John PORTER, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto : University of Toronto 
Press, 1965), p. 312. 
42 Alfred T. DE MARIA, Dale TARNOWIESKI and Richard GURMAN, 
Manager Unions? (N.Y. : American Management Association, 1972). 
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It has often been noted that a major difficulty with organizing 
retail employées is the small size of the units in which such employées 
work as contrasted to larger manufacturing units. 43 On a broader scale 
such a contrast is equally relevant between North America and Europe 
generally. The larger European « récognition units > hâve enabled the 
unions to provide services to a much broader range of employées. 
COERCION AS A FACTOR 
The structural and légal différences between the two continents 
probably account for the greatest percent of the variance in unionization. 
However, it should be pointed out that, even though formai union secu-
rity arrangements are not as prévalent in Europe, this does not mean 
that the worker is free of ail pressure to become a union member. In 
many instances informai social pressure is quite intense. In Britain, for 
example, there has been a good deal of talk about the « closed » shop. u 
As used in Britain, this term does not necessarily refer to mandatory 
union membership by contractual agreement. Instead, the « closed » 
shop is maintained by the refusai of trade unionists to work with non-
unionists. Although British management has generally opposed such 
tactics, they hâve felt it necessary to tolerate them for fear of sparking 
wild-cat strikes. 
Similar situations are, no doubt, common in other parts of Europe. 
In Sweden, for example, although there is a formai « open shop > clause 
in existence throughout industry most Swedish industrial workers are 
subject to a good deal of informai pressure to become union members 
with the resuit that over 90% of such workers are trade unionists. 
Based on bis community study of the Dutch town of Sassenheim, 
Gadourek notes that some workers who refuse to become union members 
« are often exposed to social pressures, even to ostracism. rrhey are 
either directly or indirectly (e.g. by letters put anonymously into their 
coats during the working hours) reminded that they actually profit from 
work done by the unions without paying their dues in return. » 45 In 
France, also, Hamilton has demonstrated that the continucd strength of 
43 See Marten ESTEY, «The Retail Clerks », in Albert A. BLUM, Marten 
ESTEY, James W. KUHN, Wesley A. WILDMAN and Léo TROY (eds.), White-
Collar Workers (New York : Random House, 1971), p . 60. 
44 W.E.J. McCARTHY, The Closed Shop in Britain (London : Blackwell, 
1964). 
45 Quoted in Windmuller, op. cit., p. 187. Additional support is provided by 
Van D E VALL, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 
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the Communist CGT in a milieu of increasing affluence is due, at least 
in part, to social pressure rather than to objective économie circum-
stance. ** 
CONCLUSIONS 
Certainly some workers hâve always joined trade unions because 
of strongly held beliefs in the social and économie goals of the « move-
ment ». During the early years of union development in Europe such 
sentiments may hâve been quite widespread. It is, however, doubtful 
that such motivation is of major significance today. The évidence pre-
sented hère, limited though it may be, supports the assertion that con-
temporary European unionists join unions because they either believe 
it to be in their own personal self-interest or because they are coerced 
to do so. 
Compared to North America, several aspects of the typical industrial 
relations System in Europe are detrimental to high levels of union mem-
bership. Thèse factors are, however, more than balanced out by the 
ability of European unions to provide valued individual services to a 
wide range of potential members. The formai « union shop » has not 
become widespread both because of employer opposition, ideological 
union opposition and légal prohibition. Despite this, however, informai 
pressure is probably quite common. 
In contrast to their European counterparts, North American unions 
hâve made intensive use of formai stipulations for mandatory union 
membership. Thus, where they hâve become recognized, 100% member-
ship is quite common. However, the légal Systems in North America, 
despite their often stated purpose to encourage collective bargaining are, 
in fact, very detrimental to the growth of union membership. They 
formally bar the union from ail situations except those where it has 
been able to survive the hazards of an organizing campaign and win a 
représentation élection. Since, in many situations employées are liable 
to identify with employers and fear retaliation for union activity, North 
American unions face great difficulties in expanding their influence and 
membership. There are probably many thousands of employées in North 
America who would become union members if the unions had the 
capacity to be of advantage to them. However, union services are, in 
4« Richard F. HAMILTON, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth 
Republic, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1967), Chapter XII. 
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effect, forbidden to thèse employées because of the unwilligness of a 
majority of their colleagues to opt for unionization. Perhaps, as Kahn-
Freund has pointed out, it was necessary for the governments of North 
America to « create a union monopoly of représentation in each bar-
gaining unit » because of the « intensive compétition between unions. » 47 
Whatever the reason, the resulting system has made it very difficult 
for the unions to reach high levels of unionization and until the law is 
changed they are not likely to do so. 
Les contradictions entre les syndicats européens 
et les syndicats américains 
En Europe, le pourcentage des travailleurs syndiqués est plus grand qu'il ne 
l'est aux États-Unis et au Canada. Cette situation intrigue à bien des titres. Les 
clauses de sécurité syndicale sont beaucoup moins répandues en Europe qu'elles 
ne le sont en Amérique du Nord. En Europe, la négociation collective se fait 
surtout au niveau des branches industrielles et les conventions ne fixent que des 
conditions minimales qui s'appliquent aux travailleurs non-syndiqués comme aux 
travailleurs syndiqués. En outre, les syndicats européens n'ont généralement pas 
été en mesure d'établir des sections au niveau des usines comme on a pu y 
arriver en Amérique du Nord. Ce sont les comités de travailleurs élus par l'en-
semble des employés de l'entreprise qui constituent l'organisation syndicale prin-
cipale à la base. Étant donné ces caractéristiques du régime des relations de travail 
en Europe, on pourrait s'attendre à un « parasitisme » exubérant et à un degré de 
syndicalisation très bas. 
L'explication connue de ce paradoxe, c'est que les travailleurs européens fe-
raient preuve d'un plus grand esprit de solidarité à l'égard de leurs syndicats. 
L'explication de ce phénomène par l'esprit de solidarité s'efface devant la réalité 
omniprésente de l'intérêt personnel. Donc, si l'on accepte l'explication que les 
travailleurs agissent poussés par des sentiments de solidarité envers leurs syndicats, 
force est de dire que les travailleurs européens ont un comportement anormal. 
Des études récentes démontrent pourtant que les travailleurs européens ne sont 
pas moins normaux que les camarades américains. En réalité, ils adhèrent aux syn-
dicats dans l'espoir d'en retirer des avantages personnels, ce qui, pour eux, consiste 
avant tout à se protéger contre les décisions patronales unilatérales qui peuvent 
être à leur détriment. 
On a découvert deux facteurs qui seraient de nature à expliquer ces contra-
dictions dans le comportement des syndiqués européens et des syndiqués américains: 
les différences de structure des régimes de relations du travail et la force de la 
pression sociale diffuse. En Europe, il n'est pas nécessaire que les syndicats ob-
tiennent une majorité d'adhérents dans une unité de négociation donnée pour que 
les travailleurs puissent bénéficier de leur protection. Au contraire, même dans les 
47 Otto KAHN-FREUND (éd.) Labor Relations and the Law, A Comparative 
Study (London : Stevens and Sons, 1965) pp. 7-8. 
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entreprises où les syndicats ne comptent que peu de membres, ceux-là peuvent in-
tervenir au nom d'un membre qui s'estime traité injustment. Contrairement à ce 
qui se passe en Amérique du Nord, les valeurs sociales communément acceptées 
outre-Atlantique empêchent les employeurs de chercher à contrecarrer les tentatives 
de syndicalisation. D'autre part, à cause de la puissance politique du standing social 
des syndicats, les employeurs ne sont pas enclins à prendre à la légère les démarches 
des syndicats en faveur de leurs membres. De plus, le concept de « grief » n'est pas 
très bien fixé et les syndicats se trouvent ainsi en mesure d'intervenir en faveur de 
leurs membres sur un grand nombre de points, qu'il en soit traité ou non dans les 
conventions collectives. Les syndicats ne sont pas non plus obligés de défendre les 
intérêts des non-membres et, en conséquence, seuls les membres des syndicats bé-
néficient de ce que Mark von de Vall a appelé « une assurance contre la discorde ». 
Même si la législation du travail favorise certainement la négociation collective 
en Amérique du Nord et, de façon indirecte, les syndicats qui la rendent possible, 
en réalité la législation nuit à leur développement. Même si une minorité importante 
de salariés dans une entreprise donnée ou une «unité de négociation appropriée» 
peut désirer les services d'un syndicat, le syndicat ne peut pas faire beaucoup pour 
eux. En outre, la législation du travail en Amérique du Nord autorise le « droit » 
des employeurs de « combattre » la syndicalisation, ce qui est contraire aux valeurs 
et aux mœurs européennes. 
Enfin, il y a certains indices qui démontrent que, en dépit de l'absence de retenue 
obligatoire des cotisations syndicales, dans beaucoup de pays d'Europe, la pression 
sociale ambiante qui s'exerce sur les travailleurs pour les inciter à adhérer aux syn-
dicats est considérable. 
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